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Abstract
We know surprisingly little about how the perception of visual illusions develops on children with intellectual disabilities (ID). 
The aim of the present study was to determine the specificity of the visual perception deficit to different groups of children with
ID. We compared 23 children with Down syndrome (DS) and 42 mental age-matched children with non-specific ID on two 
classes of illusory perception, one involving visual illusions of perceptual constancy, and the other ambiguous figures. The
results clearly showed that children with DS performed more poorly than the children with non-specific ID only on the 
ambiguous figures tasks. The findings are discussed in terms of the specificity of the etiology-related cognitive profiles of ID 
groups. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Down syndrome (DS) is the most prevalent genetic-chromosomal cause of intellectual disability (ID) occurring 
in an average of 1 out of every 700-1.000 live births (Dykens, Hodapp, & Finucane, 2000). It is also the most 
common and longest studied cause of ID, and has by far the most extensive body of literature (Hodapp & Zigler, 
1990). It affects both physical and cognitive development and produces a well-recognised phenotype that includes 
characteristic facial and musculoskeletal features, increased risk for a number of health concerns, and intellectual 
impairment, although affected individuals vary considerably with respect to severity of specific impairments 
(Silverman, 2007). Intellectual ability is within a range of mild to severe ID with a decline, as children grow older. It 
presents a unique etiology affecting many areas of development. The main disability associated with DS is a 
cognitive deficit which is thought to influence children’s ability to perceive process and make use of relevant 
information to solve problems and engage in appropriate behaviour (Carr, 1985). However the most characteristic 
dissociation is that between language, which is usually spared and visuospatial abilities most commonly impaired 
(Bellugi et al., 1999). 
   Furthermore many researchers noted that individuals with DS performed much better on visual-spatial tasks 
than on verbal or auditoty tasks (Rondal et al., 2004). It’s also recognized that individuals with DS do not exhibit 
striking differences between their performances on sequential-analytic processing (solving problems in serial or 
temporal order), simultaneous processing (using a holistic, synthetic, gestalt-like approach), and achievement 
(learned information, reading, math) (Hodapp, Burack, & Zigler, 1990). Additionally, they have the tendency to 
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process visual stimuli globally rather than locally and be distracted by background elements (using a holistic, 
gestalt-like approach), rather than to decompose it, which is consistent with a controlled acquisition deficit. 
However there is a compelling need to understand the underlying basis for this holistic tendency, which may 
actually be a disadvantage on some visuospatial tasks, such as visual illusions. Since individuals with DS are 
reputed to fixate globally, they may be influenced by the wider context as they aren’t able to ignore it and thus 
would be susceptible to visual illusions.  
   While the perception of visual illusions is as well-known in psychology, we know surprisingly little about how 
this phenomenon develops on children with ID [either ID of genetic origin, such as DS or non-specific ID]. Only a 
few studies (Spitz et al., 1970) in the past have looked at ID children’s perceptions of ambiguous figures and visual 
illusions. Furthermore, the findings of those experiments indicated that children with ID show difficulties in 
understanding cases in which they have to keep track of multiple representations, and also showed greater 
perceptual rigidity than typically developing (TD) children. 
 Visual illusions may possibly be the unplanned side effects of mechanisms which have evolved to fine-tune a 
specie's perceptual and cognitive capabilities (Gillam, 2000), and may thus involve psychological top-down 
projection of patterns, knowledge, and assumptions onto assumed reality. Gregory (1997) has differentiated between 
illusions as: ambiguities, paradoxes, fictions, and distortions. Furthermore, illusory perception involves a 
discrepancy between a physical state of affairs and a participant’s perception (Day, 1984). Two categories of 
illusory perception have been studied. Visual illusions of perceptual constancy involve distortions of features such 
as size, length, shape and color brightness. While there is still discussion about interpretation of visual illusions, 
there is some agreement that visual illusions arise because of some form of inappropriate constancy scaling 
(Gregory, 1997). Ambiguous figures are visual phenomena that involve repetitive, subjective changes which 
continue as long as the pattern is present (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). The phenomenology of ambiguous figures 
reversals is immediate and compelling, as in many perceptual illusions. These figures reveal top-down effects in 
perception, because the percepts change while the stimulus remains constant (Gregory, 1997). Perceivers must have 
a conceptual framework capable of representing that figures can have more than one interpretation, and the abilities 
of mental rotation, mental imagery or visual search necessary to bring about reversal (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005). 
There is by now a great deal of evidence that understanding multiple representations of figures is quite difficult for 
young children, and that this knowledge of general conceptual understanding only develops gradually in the 
preschool period, at about age 5 years (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001).  
  Illusory perception provides a tool for addressing questions about visuospatial perception in different groups of 
children with ID. The fact that one class of illusions is concerned with object processing, and the other with top-
down modulation of perception, addresses the nature of visual perception impairment in children with ID. Thus, 
these two sub-groups of individuals with ID (ID of genetic origin and non-specific ID) might manifest different 
developmental trajectories. Furthermore, the study of unique profiles of development among specific etiological 
groups of children with ID is essential for all aspects of research and educational intervention in the field of ID 
(Hodapp et al., 1990).  
  The first aim of the present study was to compare children with DS, children with non-specific ID and controls 
(TD children) on two classes of illusory perception, one concerned with visual illusions of perceptual constancy of 
size, shape and color brightness and the other concerned with ambiguous figures. The literature suggests that 
illusory or ambiguity perception is relatively impaired in children with ID rather than TD children and also that 
ambiguity perception originates in association areas (from frontal-parietal areas to visual areas) that act upon 
representations in the visual cortex (Lumer & Rees, 1999). We also tried to determine the specificity of the visual 
perception deficit to different groups of children with ID. Therefore, we hypothesized that the DS and ID groups 
would perform more poorly than controls but DS would perform the worst in all the groups on the ambiguous 
figures tasks. Taken together, the neuropathological studies (Golden & Hyman, 1994) in DS which found frontal 
lobe hypoplasia and temporal lobe anomalies, we hypothesized that these observations may be related to the specific 
cognitive difficulties that characterize DS.  
Our second aim was to relate visual illusions to intelligence. Since visual illusions involve constancy scaling 
related to object processing, whereas ambiguous figures activate brain regions concerned with higher cognitive 
functions (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999), we hypothesized that visual illusions would be independent of intelligence 
but ambiguous figures would be related to intelligence.
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2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
  The present study involved two clinical groups of participants: 23 children with DS and 41 children with non-
specific ID. The control group consisted of 42 TD children. The sex ratio in these three groups was approximately 
1:1 (M:F). The mean chronological age (CA) in DS group (M=10,18 years, S.D.= 0,49) and the mean CA in non-
specific ID group (M= 9,77 years, S.D.=0,49) were significantly higher than in the TD group (M=6,49 years, 
S.D.=0,33), (F2,103 = 812, p < .001). The groups were matched on overall mental age (MA) using the Wechsler 
intelligence scale for children WISC-III-GR (Georgas et al., 1997). The mean MA did not differ among the ID 
groups [(DS group: M=6,60 years, S.D.= 0,38), (ID group: M= 6,83 years, S.D.=0,60)] and the TD group (M=6,83 
years, S.D.=0,41), (F2,103 =1,98, p =.14, p>.10). All children with ID had mild intellectual disability (IQ: 55-70) and 
were receiving special education and none were living in institutional settings. Furthermore, none of the children in 
any of the groups had sensory impairments including hearing deficits and decreased visual acuity. Finally, none of 
the children were on drugs.  
2.2. Materials  
  Children were presented with nine visual illusions (VI) of perceptual constancy: three VI of size, three VI of 
shape and three VI of color brightness and their controls and six non colored ambiguous figures (AF). Each task was 
displayed on a laptop computer and the stimuli were presented on Adobe Director, MX 2004 program. 
    2.2.1. Visual illusions 
    These illusions required the participant to perceive illusory distortions of size, shape and color brightness. We 
used well-known examples of perspective distortions of size such as the Ponzo illusion, where two short parallel 
lines of identical length appear to differ in length when placed between oblique lines that resemble receding railway 
lines. Participants were asked to indicate whether the two short parallel lines appeared the same or different sizes. A 
similar  procedure  was  followed  for  the  remaining  two  illusions.  A  correct  answer  was  awarded  1  point.  For  the  
perspective distortions of shape we used the Shepard’s Tables illusion. The left hand lozenge-shaped table top seems 
to get longer and thinner as it rotates, but it remains identical to the right hand table-top. The receding edges of the 
tables are seen as if stretched into depth. Participants were asked to indicate whether the two tables appeared the 
same or different shapes. For the perspective distortions of color brightness the illusion’s example referred to the 
contrast of a colored object. It will appear darker against a black field that reflects less light compared to a white 
field even though the object itself did not change in color. Similarly, the eye will compensate for color contrast 
depending on the color cast of the surrounding area. Participants were asked to indicate whether the object appeared 
the same or different colors.  
2.2.2 Ambiguous figures task  
    These required participants to receive multiple perceptions in the figure-ground reversing stimuli. The 
procedure for the AF tasks was consistent with that employed by Gopnik and Rosati (2001). In the AF tasks, 
participants were shown one of the figures (e.g. duck-rabbit) and the experimenter said: “I have a funny picture for 
you, shall we have a look? Now this is a picture, which can be two different things. What do you think this is?” If 
the child generated both interpretations of the figure, he/she was asked to point to specific parts of each 
interpretation (e.g. the rabbit’s ears, or the duck’s bill). Importantly, no child generated an interpretation of the AF 
that was not a synonym of one of the interpretations (e.g. ‘rat’ for the man-mouse), a number of the same basic-level 
category (e.g. ‘goose’ for the man-mouse), or an unambiguous basic level category (e.g. ‘bird’ for the duck-rabbit). 
The children were able to score from 0 to 2. They were awarded 2 points for both interpretations and 1 point for 
single interpretation. This procedure was repeated with the vase/faces, man/mouse, saxophone player/woman’s face, 
seal/donkey and old woman/young woman figures. 
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  3. Procedure 
All participants were tested at school. Total administration time varied from participant to participant, but 
required from 2 to 2.30 h, across two sessions for each participant. The WISC-III was administered before the VI 
and AF tasks. The session took place in a quiet and familiar room.  
 4. Results 
  ANOVA indicated that factor ‘group’ significantly influences children’s performance on the VI tasks [F (5,100) 
=6,46 p<.05]. The TD children performed significantly better than the children with non-specific ID and DS. Post 
hoc LSD test indicated that there was statistically significant difference in TA vs ID groups (p<.05) and in TA vs SD 
groups (p<.05), but there wasn’t statistically significant difference on the performance of ID vs DS groups (p >.05). 
Additionally, ANOVA indicated that factor ‘group’ significantly influences children’s performance on the AF tasks
[F (5,100) =12,36 p<.001]. The children with DS performed significantly more poorly than the children with non-
specific ID and TD. Post hoc LSD test indicated that there was statistically significant difference in TA vs SD 
groups (p<.001) and in ID vs DS groups (p<.05), but there wasn’t statistically significant difference on the 
performance of ID vs TD groups (p > .05).  
Inspection of the response data for AF showed that children with DS identified multi-stability less often than 
other groups and tended to make more single interpretations. Figure-ground reversal (i.e., identification of both the 
duck and the rabbit) was achieved by 17,5% of the TD group and 11,41% of the ID group, but only 4,3% of the DS 
group. 
Further analysis indicated that there were positive and significant Pearson correlations between the tasks and the 
verbal and performance ability subscales of WISC-III for the groups. Actually, for the TD group only the 
performance on the AF tasks was significantly correlated with the Verbal IQ (r= .42, p =.005), the Full scale IQ (r=
.37, p =.016) and the Arithmetic (r= .43, p =.004).  For  the  ID  group  only  the  performance  on  the  AF  tasks  was  
significantly correlated with the Verbal IQ (r= .35, p =.022), the Full scale IQ (r= .44, p =.004) and the Information 
(r= .36, p =.02).  Finally  for  the  DS group the  performance  on  the  AF tasks  was  significantly  correlated  with  the  
Performance IQ (r= .44, p =.035), the Full scale IQ (r= .64, p =.001) and the Block design (r= .47, p =.024). 
5. Conclusions  
    The results clearly showed that children with DS and children with non-specific ID performed more poorly 
than the TD children, as they failed to perceive many of the two-dimensional VI tested here. These data were in 
accordance with other previous researches (Spitz & Blackman, 1959). However, children with DS are more 
impaired than other groups in the perception of AF that involve figure-ground reversals. The impairment of children 
with DS on AF is consisted with data suggesting that the perception of figure-ground relationships is related to the 
specific cognitive phenotype (Hodapp & Zigler, 1990), as they tended to operate visual stimuli in a global manner, 
making more single interpretations.The alternative interpretation is that the “top-down” character of reversal is 
pervasive. Not only do we need the specific information about the alternative interpretations, but we also need the 
general conceptual understanding that multiple interpretations of AF are possible. The apparently immediate 
experience of reversal can only occur when this conceptual framework is in place. However, the findings showed 
that the experience of perceptual reversal develops at a surprisingly late age, at about age from 5 to 9, and may well 
be related to more abstract higher-order cognitive capacities, such as executive function, mental imagery and visual 
search. While VI concern perceptual processes, it may be that the top-down control required for ambiguity in 
perception overlaps with the system controlling perception for action (Milner & Goodale, 1996), in accordance with 
recent theories proposing that processing of AF is part of a more general-purpose mechanism that also mediates the 
control of attention and exploratory eye movements (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). Ambiguity in perception is 
related to intelligence in adulthood (Crain, 1961), and here, performance IQ (several subscales of which, such as 
Block Design, require motor visual abilities) was correlated with AF only in DS group, but not with VI. Then, it is 
possible to say that these deficits in perceiving AF that depend on depth can be explained by the specific cognitive 
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and visuospatial phenotype of children with DS. Children with DS showed an aptitude for focusing on whole whilst 
ignoring the details more often than children with non-specific ID. This difficulty needs further exploration in terms 
of clinical correlates, processing characteristics, and neuropathological substrate. On the contrary, significantly more 
children with DS and non-specific ID showed susceptibility when making verbal judgements about the properties of 
size, shape and color brightness in illusory contexts. These similarities in performance of VI in both clinical groups 
may be explained by the fact that these tasks require: a change in visual perspectives taking, linguistic abilities and, 
some executive functions—including inhibitory control and management of attention, that are usually deficient in 
the atypical population in general. 
   Examining the correlations of AF performance in the groups, we found that for the TD and non-specific ID
groups the AF tasks tended to correlate with specific verbal abilities and only for DS group with performance IQ. 
Thus, it can generally be argued that generally AF performance requires a verbal ability which is similar to the 
cognitive ability measured by the WISC-III verbal subscales, such as Information and Arithmetic. Indeed, these 
subscales require verbal processing, verbal short, mental imagery and long-term memory skills and problem solving 
styles, which closely resemble the visual-auditory sequencing AF tasks. These associations between AF perception 
and cognitive skills (verbal and performance abilities) for clinical groups indicate that some additional process 
probably is required either through the use of mental imagery or in directing attention to other parts of the 
meaningful figure. Further research is needed to determine which aspects of visual perception and which cognitive 
developments are necessary to perceive visual illusions. 
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